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A graduate tax fifty years on: a




Howard Glennerster, Stephen Merrett and Gail Wilson – social welfare
economists at the London School of Economics at the time – summarised
the debates about a graduate tax system to fund UK higher education in
our first ever edition. In many ways the ‘classic’ type of ‘problem-
solving’ HER article, ‘A Graduate Tax’ identified a clear current policy
problem and deployed thoughtful and informed analysis of key issues
that would need consideration if such a policy solution were to be
implemented. This Editorial Commentary seeks to both celebrate the
authors’ (literally) timeless work and critically evaluate the prospects of
a graduate tax in England, in the context of what has long been
considered among the most highly marketised of national HE systems
(Huisman, Meek and Wood, 2007; Marginson, 2013).
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
A graduate tax: the debate
Fifty years on, the authors have all gone on to have influential careers
across various academic public policy fields; indeed Glennerster and
Wilson remain Emeritus at the LSE; similarly, the idea of a graduate tax
has never gone away. While the debates about a graduate tax remain, the
wider context has changed in almost every aspect and it is important to
both revisit their work on its own terms as well as investigating the
prospects for a graduate tax solution to the ongoing problem of HE
financing today.
Glennerster et al. laid out the case for a graduate case on the
following bases:
1. Post-Robbins expansion would soon make the system unaffordable;
the non-university attending masses should have a way of recovering
their costs
2. A tax on graduates would ‘ease the constraints on the system’
because increasing revenues would finance more expansion
3. Efficiency – assuming all students receive non means-tested grants
for maintenance it removes blockages to access for the working class
– as the authors put it ‘Income is provided when it is needed, and
repayment made when it can be afforded’ (p27)
4. It would increase university autonomy – although that would depend
on the Treasury passing on the revenue to the universities
The paper considered some of the arguments against – the most
powerful of which – and one that applies to the current deferred
repayment system – is that if the tax was set too high it might lead to
increased emigration to avoid repayment.
Much of the paper is devoted to modelling the optimum level of such
a tax and while the current author is not competent to comment on these
calculations, it is revealing to note some of the prior assumptions
employed because they are relevant to contemporary debates. One is that
a graduate tax would remove any dependency link to parental income
(again on the assumption of non means-tested grants). Another emerges
during the discussion about the correct level of repayments when it is
noted that economists of the time had ‘virtually no information relating
educational qualifications to earnings’ (p31). A third is revealed during
the discussion about the most appropriate taxation rate when a ‘drop-out’
rate of 14 per cent is discussed as a norm. This latter assumption should
be essential reading for contemporary policymakers of the ‘more =
worse’ tendency who equate high drop-out with working class and ‘non-
traditional’ participation and who regularly angst about completion rates
below 90 per cent, yet it was blithely accepted among the much narrower
social class range of students attending the universities of 1968. One
further consideration that Glennerster et al. brought to our attention is
that the immediate effect of a graduate tax would be to increase – rather
than reduce – public expenditure; again this is predicated on the idea that
non means-tested maintenance grants would be awarded to all students,
in effect a (repayable) support bursary for students.
The length of time it would take for graduate tax revenue to
sufficiently support the system would, of course, depend on the level of
repayment. For Glennerster et al., this level of knowledge would await
the kind of link between individual qualifications’ return on investment
and course costs that the government is currently developing in the form
of Longitudinal Educational Outcomes (LEO) in an effort to add more
detail to the crude estimates derived from the Destination of Leavers
from Higher Education (DLHE) surveys of graduates. But of course,
these instruments have been developed and refined for quite other
purposes than identifying an appropriate tax rate, given the edifice of a
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marketised system predicated on differentiated variable tuition fees
developed over the last fifteen years in England.
Glennerster et al also considered the question of whether graduates
should cease to pay the graduate tax once they had repaid the cost of
their own higher education (p35) and if so how to administer a system
which would, again, only be possible with LEO type data inconceivable
to the 1968 imaginary: ‘Would the incidence of tax have to vary for
every course in every institution in every year?’ they ask, also
speculating how such a system would account for the varying familial
responsibilities and income trajectories of individual graduates (p35).
Having considered all the attendant difficulties, Glennerster and his co-
authors believed a graduate tax to be workable if supported by other
changes to the taxation and public spending system. In their final
analysis it was deemed fair that the tax would ‘only fall on those who
increased their earning power by entering higher education’ (p36), but
the progressive or redistributive benefits could be subverted by the
wealthy if they were allowed to repay the costs in full on graduation,
thus disincentivising those that could not afford this option. At base,
they noted, the adoption of a graduate tax would represent a shift of the
burden of tax ‘towards earners as opposed to the owners of wealth’ (p36)
a central tenet of what has since come to be described as the ‘neoliberal
turn’ (Lynch 2006; Sellar 2013; Savage 2013).
While the idea of a graduate tax was never adopted by government
(or more pertinently, encouraged by the universities), it is an idea that
has found support across the political spectrum since the introduction of
partial tuition fees (in 1998), variable tuition fees (in 2004, designed to
encourage a differentiated market among institutions) and again since
the imposition of full cost fees in 2010. In 2009 the National Union of
Students proposed such a system, as did DavidWilletts Minister of State
for Universities and Science at the time of the publication of the Browne
Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance (Browne
2010), his Secretary of State Vince Cable (Cable 2010) and several
prominent Labour politicians, albeit mostly when in Opposition. In the
event the idea was dropped due to the problems highlighted by
Glennerster et al.; the difficulties of avoiding potential overpayment by
graduates that went on to earn the highest incomes (Barr 2012), and the
impossibility of collecting taxes from graduates that emigrated, or
indeed of collecting repayments from EU students eligible for fee loans.
The complex income contingent deferred repayment system that
government did subsequently adopt (BIS 2011) has often been seen as
‘virtually’ a graduate tax, albeit not ‘in-name’. In more recent years the
idea has been resurrected by the free market Adam Smith Institute in
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2017 and former Secretary of State for Education Justine Greening in
2018.
A graduate tax: a solution to a different problem
As ever, the arguments for and against are rehearsed largely in the same
terms as Glennerster and colleagues fifty years ago; meanwhile the
entire edifice of the English marketised system as developed by
successive governments seriously shifts the parameters of the debate,
and thus the prospects of such a reform. On one level the perceived
inequities of the current system, which loads up to £50,000 of fee plus
maintenance loan debt on graduates (and, perversely, the most on those
from the poorest backgrounds in the absence of maintenance grants)
drives the search for reform of student finance; on another level, the
specific version of a differentiated market that pertains in the English
system relies on that same inequity to drive consumer choice.
The current HE marketplace – constructed in stages since Students at
the Heart of the System (DBIS 2011) (which introduced the £9,000
tuition-fee regime) and consolidated by the Higher Education and
Research Act (HMSO 2017) – relies almost entirely on persuading
applicants that some HE institutions and some programmes of study are
worth more than others; the very presence of the ‘£50,000 debt’ threat is
designed to force consumers to shop around for cheaper provision. As
the 2015 Green Paper put it:
Now that we are asking young people to meet more of the costs of
their degrees once they are earning, we in turn must do more than
ever to ensure they can make well informed choices, and that the
time and money they invest in higher education is well spent. (DBIS,
2015, Foreword by Minister of State for Universities and Science, Jo
Johnson MP)
Even more starkly, the following White Paper Success as a knowledge
economy insisted that:
Competition between providers in any market incentivises them to
raise their game, offering consumers a greater choice of more
innovative and better quality products and services at lower cost.
Higher education is no exception. (DBIS, 2016, Executive Summary,
para 7)
The policy intention is thus laid bare: it is up to consumers to actuate
choice so that they can reap the reward of lower fees and better quality.
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Rather than seeking a fairer way of affording publically funded higher
education (Glennerster et al.‘s noble cause) current policymakers are in
fact wedded to creating a tuition price differential that serves two related
ends (McCaig 2018). Firstly, that the fee differential between
institutions should roughly match the entry requirements differential
(based on UCAS tariff points*) with only those institutions that can
demand the highest UCAS points able to justify the maximum fee (now
capped at £9,250), with the fees charged by institutions less able to
demand higher tariff points tapering off under competitive pressure from
new providers encouraged to market with fewer entry barriers (Evans
2015; 2016). Secondly, that the average tuition fee across the system is
thus reduced from its current level (£8,700) to around £7,500, the figure
deemed by government to make the repayment regime affordable (DBIS
2011). In this market the only motive power is that of the applicant
consumer: in this framing the problem is higher than optimal average
tuition fees; the solution is price quality comparison and increased
supply, hence the new providers. A graduate tax, in many (illusory) ways
so close to the current policy construct, would actually remove the only
motive power that will differentiate institutions by price. A graduate tax
may eventually be introduced, in some form or other, by some
government or other, but it is not a solution to the problem set by this set
of policymakers: how to create a consumer driven fee differential that
separates the research elite from the rest of the sector, while at the same
time reducing average tuition fees in the system.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
* The Universities and Colleges Application System in the UK operates a
comparison of various equivalent entry qualifications, producing an ordinal scale of
UCAS Tariff points achieved by applicants. UCAS points, in the absence of
differentiated tuition fees, act as the effective ‘sticker price’.
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